A new language for epistemic logic is introduced in which the epistemic operators are of the form |
Introduction
Reasoning about knowledge by the help of logical notions and tools has originated a mess of different approaches to knowledge depending, among other things, on the intended applications: ordinary language, artificial intelligence, game theory, comunication protocols. Various types of logics have been introduced starting with epistemic logics in the style of Hintikka [6] , then multi-agent logics and common knowledge logics in the style of Fagin et al., [4] . This last book has set the agenda for future research up to the present days and this paper locates itself in its wake. Typically, the first step of every approach considered consists in setting the appropriate language in order to deal with the chosen aspect or variant of the notion of knowledge under study. As a matter of fact most of the languages are propositional languages obtained by adding to the boolean connectives a finite set of modal operators. In the case of epistemic logic these operators are indexed by agents K i , K j , . . .
agent i knows that A When we move to first-order level, quantification is allowed with respect to A but not with respect to the agents, we can say that 'i knows that someone is P ', but not that 'someone knows that someone is P '.
We will take a quite different approach by introducing epistemic operators indexed by terms analogous to the indexed modal operators for alethic modalities. In the case of alethic modalities, see [2] , 2P (x) is not a wellformed formula since x is free in P (x) and it has to be replaced by
to be read as 'it is necessary for x to be P (x)'. | x | is a box-operator indexed by x. A more complex form of the box-operator is the following one
'it is necessary for the individual i to have the property λx.P (x)'. Dually, 'it is necessary for i and j to stand in the relation λxλy.R(x, y)'. In the case of epistemic modalities we need to distinguish the agent of the act of knowing from the objects of knowledge, therefore epistemic operators will have the form | t :
. . . where x 1 . . . x n is a list of variables without repetitions that may contain also variables occurring in t, and A contains at most the variables x 1 . . . x n . Features of the notation just introduced:
• the epistemic operator binds the variables x 1 , . . . , x n occurring in A
• the variables occurring in t, t 1 , . . . , t n are the free variables of |t :
• if A is a sentence | t : | A is well formed, 't knows that A'
• by convention | x : x 1 . . . x n |A stands for | x :
• substitution is indicated inside the epistemic operator, it is not carried out in A
. . .
tn[s/y] xn
| A
• substitution does not commute with epistemic operators.
We need to add specific axioms if we want substitution to commute with epistemic-operators.
Before giving the formal definition of a first-order epistemic language with indexed knowledge operators, let us look at some examples.
All Mary's friends know that she likes Paul ∀x(friend(x, M ary) → |x :
M ary y | likes(y, P aul)) and this sentence is not equivalent to ∀x(friend(x, M ary) → |x : | likes(M ary, P aul))
In the latter sentence Mary is in a de dicto position, in the former sentence in a de re position.
Someone knows that all Peter's friends know that he likes Mary ∃x|x : • Terms are either variables or individual constants and the set of free variables occurring in a term t, f v(t), is either {t} if t is a variable or the empty set, otherwise.
• The logical symbols are ⊥, →, ∀, | t :
. . . tn xn |, n ≥ 0, where x 1 , . . . , x n is a list of pairwise distinct variables and t, t 1 , . . . , t n are terms. When n = 0 we write |t : |. Definition 2.2 of well formed formula and of free variable in a wff. wff free variables
| t : 
where
where z doesn't occur in ∀yA and z / ∈ {s 1 , . . . , s k } if y ∈ {x 1 , . . . , x k } and y ∈ {s 1 , . . . , s k } ∀yA if y ∈ {x 1 , . . . , x k }
• (| t :
|A

Semantics
The main idea behind the epistemic transition semantics is that |t :
is true at a world w if t is an individual existing at w, s is an individual existing at w and in all worlds compatible with the epistemic state of t the t-counterparts of s (the counterparts of s according to t) in those worlds satisfy P (x).
is true at a world w if t is an individual existing at w and in all worlds compatible with the epistemic state of t whoever is s in those worlds satisfies P (x).
An epistemic transition model (in brief, an epistemic model ) is a family of classical models endowed with (1) a relation of compatibility between individuals and models and (2) a counterpart relation between individuals of different models or of the same model. We will call worlds the classical models, following the terminology of possible world semantics. In details, let W be a not empty set of worlds, so each w ∈ W is a pair D w , I w where D w is a not-empty set, the domain of w and I w is an interpretation function such that:
We assume that D w ∩ D v = ∅ when w = v. By ≺ we denote a relation between elements of E = {D w } w∈W and elements of W :
If a ≺ v holds, then we say that the world v is epistemically compatible with the individual a or that v is compatible with the epistemic state of a. By a we denote the counterpart relation parametrized by the individual a:
c holds, then we say that c is a counterpart of b according to a (in a world epistemically compatible with a).
is a quintuple where W and ≺ are defined as above, = { a } a∈E , D is a function that associates to any w ∈ W its domain D w and I is a function that associates to any w ∈ W its interpretation function I w .
Definition 3.2 For every
x d denotes the w-assignment which behaves exactly like σ except that it maps
Given a w-assignment σ the interpretation of t in w under σ, I σ w (t), is defined in the standard way:
Notational convention. When no ambiguity can arise, we write σ(t) instead of I σ w (t).
Definition 3.3 of satisfaction. We define when a wff
• A wff A is true at w in M, |= • A wff A is true in M, |= M A, iff for every w, |= M w A.
• A wff A is valid on a class C of epistemic transition models iff A is true in each of them.
Lemma 3.5 on substitution and satisfaction for terms and formulas. Let σ be a w-assignment.
Proof By induction on A.
•
• A = ∀yB and y = s and y = x
The cases in which either y = s or y = x are similar.
Validity
The epistemic semantics we have seen so far is a generalization of the transition semantics presented in Corsi [2] and at the same time a particular case of a more general semantics called cone transition semantics due to Gabriele Tassi [?] and [3] . Most of the results proved in [2] hold for the epistemic case. The main difference with respect to transition semantics is that the accessibility relation among worlds is parametrized by individuals. We do not say anymore that a world w is related to or accessible to another world v, but rather that v is compatible with the epistemic state of an individual a living in w. Moreover, as we have seen, also the counterpart relation is parametrized by individuals, so we speak of the a-counterpart of b, meaning the counterpart of b according to a, parametrized by a.
Notice first that no condition has been put in order to establish some connections between the counterparts in a world v of an individual b living in w and the interpretation of b in v. This fact has the consequence that the following two types of knowledge are quite different:
i knows of t and s that they are equal
The first sentence is true at a world w iff in all worlds v compatible with the epistemic state of i, all the i-counterparts in v of t and s (the interpretation of t and s in w) are identical. The second sentence is true at w iff in all worlds v compatible with the epistemic state of i the interpretation of t and s in v are identical.
For particular individual constants i, t and s we can assume that the i-counterparts in a world v of t in w include the interpretation of t in v. A consequence is that the wff
is valid. When this is the case we say that the terms t and s are i-rigid, i.e. are rigid terms from the point of view of i. For some student i it might well be that if (s)he knows of Walter Scott and Ivanhoe that the first is the author of the second, than (s)he knows also the fact that Walter Scott is the author of Ivanhoe, because in the worlds (s)he can envisage the counterparts of both Walter Scott and Ivanhoe include the interpretations of both names in those worlds.
We can impose even stronger constrains on the counterpart relation, e.g.
This equivalence doesn't hold in general, not even for variables, instead the following implication, say from de re to de dicto, holds for variables: Therefore we say that variables are rigid designators. In the case of aletic modalities it is often assumed that all terms, not just variables, are rigid designators and so the following formula is taken as an axiom |i : y|(y = y) → | i :
It is certainly true that in all worlds compatible with the epistemic state of i, each individual is identical with itself, but at the same time if y has two different i-counterparts in a world v, then (x 1 = x 2 ) may be falsified in v.
The epistemic logic Q.K e
Now we present a calculus for epistemic logic which makes no assumptions either on the compatibility relation or on the counterpart relation. Q.K e intends to be the core system of any quantified logic either of belief or of knowledge or of obligation. We can think of weaker systems than Q.K e in the style of Gabriele Tassi [7] , where the greater generality of Tassi's systems resides in the fact that the epistemic operators are indexed by lists of terms and not by pairs composed of a term and a set of terms, as we do, see axiom P RM .
Here are the axioms and inference rules of Q.K e .
Tautologies PRM e |x : x 1 . . . x n |A ↔ |x :
| y :
where v 1 . . . v k are the variables y 1 . . . y n without ripetitions.
The notions of proof and theorem are defined in the usual way.
Completeness of Q.K e
The completeness proof we present follows the same strategy of the proof given in Corsi [2] and in Ghilardi [1] . Given a language with indexed operators L, we define a classical first-order language L which contains the same predicate and constant symbols of L, and moreover for each formula | t : x 1 . . . x n |A of L a new predicate symbol P n+1 | :x 1 ...xn |A . Then we translate each formula of L into a formula of L according to the following definition:
Proof. By induction on A.
• Let y = x and y = s.
The other cases relative to quantified formulas are similar.
We now define a classical theory Q.K e whose specific axioms are
Proof. We show that Q.Ke
⇒ holds by definition of Q.K e ⇐ holds because the specific axioms of Q.K e are the translations of the theorems of Q.K e and the inference rules of Q.K e are also inference rules of Q.K e .
Let S be a family of classical models for Q.K e . Each model w is a pair D w , I w where D w is a not-empty set, the domain of w and I w is an interpretation function. With σ, w c |= B we denote that the formula B is satisfied by the assignment σ in the model w according to the standard classical definition and with w c |= B that B is (classically) true in the model w.
Lemma 5.4 Let σ be a w-assignment and A a wff of L.
Proof By induction on A. We examine the case when A is |t : 
Definition 5.5 Let w, v be Q.K e -models. For any a ∈ D w we say that
In words, v is compatible with the epistemic state of a iff every sentence known by a is true in v.
Definition 5.6 Let w, v be Q.K e -models. For any a ∈ D w , a relation a ⊆ D w × D v is said to be a transition relation admissible for a iff for every k ≥ 0, every w-assignment σ and every v-assignment τ ,
holds for every formula A containing (at most) the variables x 1 , ..., x k .
Lemma 5.7 Let w be a Q.K e -model and σ, w c |= |x : x 1 ...x m |A for some formula |x : x 1 ...x m |A and w-assignment σ. Then there is a Q.K e -model v and a v-assignment τ such that:
} is a transition relation admissible for σ(x).
Proof
• Let Γ be the following set of (classical) formulae:
First we show that Γ is Q.K e -consistent. Assume by reductio that it is not, then:
Therefore, we would have that σ, w • By the way Γ is defined, Γ contains all the formulae B without free variables such that σ, w c |= |x : |B , therefore σ(x) ≺ v.
• We have to show that the set
is a counterpart relation admissible for σ(x), i.e. for any k > 0, any formula C(y 1 , . . . , y k ), any w-assignment π and any v-assignment µ, if
By the definition of
µ(y i ) , i = 1 . . . k, then for some
It follows from (ii) that:
Given that y 1 , ..., y k are all the free variables in C and that π(y) = σ(x), this is equivalent to: 
By lemma 3.5 we get that:
But all the free variables of C are among y 1 , ..., y k , therefore this is equivalent to:
µ(y i ) for all i = 1 . . . k, then, for all i = 1 . . . k there is a x j i ∈ {x i , ..., x m } such that τ (x j i ) = µ(y i ). Therefore we have:
The set
as defined in lemma 5.7 gives the minimal counterpart relation that links the model w to the model v in dependence of the formula A, the w-assignment σ and the individual σ(x). Between D w and D v no other counterpart relation is taken into account even if extensions of σ(x) may be admissible. If σ(x) = a for some a ∈ D w , we call the set a the canonical counterpart relation relative to a, w and v, in brief CNTP(a,w,v). Notice that if CN T P (a, w, v) = ∅, then a ≺ w.
Definition 5.8 Let S be a set of Q.K e -models. We say that:
• w ∈ S is realized in S iff for each w-assignment σ and each formula |x :
..x m |A, then there is a Q.K emodel v ∈ S and a v-assignment τ such that:
• S is fully realized iff every member of S is realized in S and for any z, w ∈ S, if z = w then D z ∩ D w = ∅.
Lemma 5.9 For every Q.K e -model w there is a set S w of Q.K e -models such that: 
It corresponds to the following conditions: As shown in [2] , some conditions of the counterpart relation correspond to modal formulas.
• The Barcan formula : ∀y|x : y, x 1 , . . . , x n |A → |x : x 1 , . . . , x n |∀yA corresponds to the property of the counterpart relation of being surjective.
If Peter knows of all his friends that they are trustworthy, then Peter knows that all his friends are trustworthy.
∀y(best friend(y, P eter) → |P eter : y|trustworthy(y)) → |P eter : |∀y(best friend(y, P eter) → trustworthy(y))
This sentence can be falsified if in worlds compatible with the epistemic state of Peter now, Peter has friends apart from the Peter-counterparts of his friends now.
• The Ghilardi formula : ∃y|x : y, x 1 , . . . , x n |A → |x : x 1 , . . . , x n |∃yA corresponds to the property of the counterpart relation of being everywhere defined.
If Peter knows of his best friend that he is trustworthy, then Peter knows that someone is trustworthy.
∃y(best friend(y, P eter)∧|P eter : y | trusthworthy(y)) → |P eter : |∃y trustworthy(y)
This sentence can be falsified if in worlds compatible with the epistemic state of Peter now, there are no Peter-counterparts of Peter's best friend now.
• The knowledge of identity : x = y → |z : x, y|(x = y) corresponds to the property of the counterpart relation of being functional.
If Peter's best friend is Brian's father, then Peter knows of his best friend that he is Brian's father. • The knowledge of diversity : x = y → |z : x, y|(x = y) corresponds to the property of the counterpart relation of not being convergent.
If Peter's best friend is not Brian's father, then Peter knows of his best friend that he is not Brian's father.
P bf = B f → |p :
y |(x = y) This sentence can be falsified since Peter-counterparts of Peter's best friend now can be the same as Peter-counterparts of Brian's father in all worlds compatible with the epistemic state of Peter now.
